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INTRODUCTION 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 had a devastating effect on the economy of New York 
City and the surrounding metropolitan area.  With its proximity to the World Trade 
Center, Chinatown was one of the neighborhoods most severely affected.  Roads were 
closed for several weeks and foot traffic, the lifeblood of the neighborhood, came to a 
standstill.  Tunnels and bridges into the city were also closed or restricted for several 
weeks, making it impossible for trucks to get in and out, which led to the immediate 
closing of more than 40 garment factories.  As a result, thousands of workers in 
Chinatown lost their jobs. The Century Foundation reported that one-fourth of 
Chinatown’s workforce was laid off as a result of the September 11th terrorist attacks.1  
 
In response to the massive job loss in Chinatown, a $1,101,917 contract was awarded to 
the Chinatown Manpower Project (CMP) as part of the National Emergency Grant (NEG) 
given to New York State.  CMP subcontracted with three other service providers, the 
New York Urban League (NYUL), the Chinese-American Planning Council (CPC) and 
the Chinese Christian Herald Crusade (CCHC).   
 
The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) commissioned Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) 
to provide a descriptive evaluation of the issues, services provided and the effectiveness 
of the NEG awarded to CMP in meeting the employment needs of the Chinatown 
community.  Further, the USDOL asked that P/PV provide recommendations on how 
National Emergency Grants can be structured to help communities facing similar 
challenges in the future.   In March and early April of 2003, P/PV collected information 
through interviews with program staff and key informants knowledgeable about the 
grantee organizations, Chinatown or the NEG.  (See Appendix A for a list of key 
informants.)  Budgetary information and data on outcomes were obtained directly from 
the contractors.   
 
First, the report briefly examines the impact of September 11th on Chinatown, provides an 
overview of the NEG and the structure of the CMP contract, and explores the history and 
context of Chinatown.  Next, we examine the services provided by CMP and two of its 
subcontractors and the characteristics of the populations they served.    Then the report 
examines the outcomes achieved by the individual grantees and assesses whether the 
NEG generated an overall expansion or change in services.   We conclude with an overall 
assessment of the Chinatown NEG and recommendations about how the NEG could be 
adjusted to respond to similar situations in the future.  
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THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11th ON CHINATOWN 
 
The impact of September 11th on Chinatown has been well documented.  The Fiscal 
Policy Institute, the Community Service Society, the New York City Partnership, the 
Center for an Urban Future and the Century Foundation each issued reports in the first 
few months after the attack, focusing on its economic impact on the city.  Each report 
discusses the effect the attacks had on Chinatown’s primary industries—tourism and 
garment work—and the workers who lost their jobs in these industries.2  A November 
2002 report by the Asian American Federation of New York dealt entirely with the 
effects of September 11th on Chinatown and provided an assessment of the government’s 
response.3     
 
Prior to September 11th, the sidewalks of Chinatown were a constant bustle of tourists 
and consumers patronizing the neighborhood’s retail establishments.  Large tour busses 
could be seen regularly carting tourists in and out of Chinatown.   For several weeks after 
September 11th, Chinatown was effectively shut down.  Movement in lower Manhattan 
was limited to residents and workers.  Telephone lines were nonfunctional, making it 
difficult for businesses to operate.  Even when streets were reopened and telephone lines 
were repaired, travel fears kept many tourists away from New York.4   
 
The impact on the garment industry was particularly devastating.  In the days following 
the terrorist attacks, many bridges and tunnels into Manhattan were closed and the 
Holland and Brooklyn-Battery tunnels remained so for several weeks to allow passage for 
trucks involved in the recovery and clean-up effort.  Streets south of Canal Street, the 
main transportation artery of Chinatown, did not reopen to regular traffic until a month 
after the terrorist attacks.  As a result, garment trucks could not get in and out of the city 
or into Chinatown and, within a short period of time, many garment factories closed.5  As 
consumer demand fell, buyers reduced and sometimes cancelled orders for garment 
production, further damaging the industry. 6  The Fiscal Policy Institute estimates that the 
garment industry suffered more than any other industry in New York in terms of reduced 
work volume.7  Before September 11th, the number of garment factories in Chinatown 
was estimated around 250, approximately 65 of which have closed since the terrorist 
attacks.8  Reduced work volume and factory closings led to the displacement of 
thousands of Chinese workers.  This decline coincided with the traditional seasonal 
downturn, compounding the problems – the difference being that more factories actually 
closed rather than just reducing their hours, as would be typical during a seasonal 
downturn.   
 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANT AWARDED IN CHINATOWN 
 
The goal of the September 11th NEG was to increase the capacity of the workforce 
system to provide employment services to workers dislocated as a result of September 
11th.  Of the $50 million NEG dollars awarded nationwide in response to the attacks, $25 
million went to New York State, which distributed the majority of its funding to New 
York City organizations.  In December 2001, to respond to mass layoffs in Chinatown, 
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NEG funds were awarded to CMP and three subcontractors as part of the State’s World 
Trade Center NEG grant.   
 
The National Emergency Grant Program 
 
The NEG is a federal program used to respond to events that lead to the major dislocation 
of workers such as plant closures, mass layoffs, closures and realignments of military 
installations and natural disasters.  As a discretionary program of the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA), the NEG attempts to meet the needs of dislocated workers that 
cannot be met through WIA formula funds.  The NEG provides eligible workers 
adjustment assistance, which includes the core, intensive and training services authorized 
under WIA.  The NEG differs from the structure of WIA in that it allows for the creation 
of temporary jobs related to disaster relief efforts.9  For example, an NEG was awarded to 
New York State in 1998 after a series of ice storms rendered roads impassable.  
Temporary jobs were created to clean up the roads and to provide work for dislocated 
workers.   
 
After a disaster or emergency has been declared within a particular state, the state 
government or local boards can apply for an NEG, and can then enter into contracts with 
other organizations to provide services.  Typically, a governor will apply for an NEG, but 
the grant will be allocated and administered at the local level.   
 
New York State’s September 11th NEG 
 
To make funding available quickly, the New York State Department of Labor 
(NYSDOL) contracted directly with local contractors.  In accordance with state 
procurement law, the contractors initially identified were on a list of New York City 
approved employment service providers, previously competitively awarded these 
contracts by the New York City Department of Employment.    On October 14, 2001, 
NYSDOL met with 21 approved providers to explain the NEG and its requirements.  The 
NEG was structured as a line- item contract rather than a performance-based contract in 
order to make the money available to provide services immediately.  Performance goals 
were negotiated individually around a general goal of 70 percent placement.10  However, 
there were no financial consequences for failure to meet this goal.  The average allowable 
cost per participant was $4,000.  The cost per participant was stipulated in the federal 
award letter to New York State; the placement performance measure was also a required 
element in the federal award. 
 
NEG funds were awarded to a total of 14 workforce development providers in New York 
City, including CMP, which entered into subcontracts with CPC, CCHC and the NYUL, 
working with the U.S. Department of Labor and NY State Department of Labor to 
expedite the grant and contracting process. (With the agreement of representatives of 
USDOL, the NYUL was not examined for this report, which focuses on Chinatown; the 
NYUL provided services only in Brooklyn to a predominantly African American and 
Latino population.)  While CMP was the prime contractor, its principal administrative 
role was to collect performance and demographic data from subcontractors and submit 
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that information to the state.  The contract did not specify the need for coordinated 
services among the three agencies, which would have taken time to develop.  Rather, the 
emphasis was on how to make funds available most quickly for service provision.  
 
THE CONTEXT OF CHINATOWN 
 
While September 11th had a devastating impact on Chinatown, the neighborhood and its 
workers had already been facing multiple challenges related to a changing economy.  The 
garment industry had been in decline for years.  High commercial and residential rents 
had begun pushing residents and businesses out of Chinatown.  An examination of the 
history, economy and services of Chinatown provide a context for understanding the 
factors that influenced the selection and performance of NEG contractors.  
 
History of Chinatown 
 
The first Chinese to come to the United States in large numbers arrived on the west coast 
during the gold rush of the 1840s and 1850s. Some came to mine gold and others were 
brought by labor brokers to build the Central Pacific Railroad.  As the gold mines dried 
up and the railroad neared completion, Chinese workers started to take low-paid jobs in 
textile and other manufacturing operations.  Tensions erupted when white laborers felt 
that their jobs were being taken and their wages undercut by Chinese workers.   Severe 
discrimination and incidences of mob violence drove masses of Chinese eastward.  These 
immigrants became the first inhabitants of what was to become New York’s 
Chinatown. 11   
 
The New York community reacted similarly to the influx of Chinese immigrants and felt 
threatened by the availability of inexpensive Chinese labor.  In 1882, the Chinese 
Exclusion Act was passed, prohibiting the naturalization of any Chinese persons already 
in the United States, and restricting immigration to individuals with work permits.  The 
law also prohibited immigration by the wives and children of Chinese workers who had 
secured work permits, making Chinatown a predominantly male community around the 
turn of the century. 12   
 
In 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Act was lifted, China was given a small immigration 
quota and New York’s Chinatown expanded slowly until the late 1960s.  These 
immigrants often found employment in garment businesses, restaurants and hand-
laundries where they typically worked off the books for less than the minimum wage.  In 
1968, the quota for China was raised, leading to a large increase in the population of 
Chinatown. 13   
 
Chinatown Today 
 
New York’s Chinatown is located on the lower east side of Manhattan, just a few blocks 
from the World Trade Center site.  While Canal Street is clearly the neighborhood’s main 
thoroughfare, the boundaries of Chinatown are less clear.  The Asian American 
Federation in Chinatown One Year After September 11th: An Economic Impact Study 
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defined the boundaries to include 13 census tracts, based on the percentage of residents in 
each tract who were Asian.  According to this analysis, in 2000 Chinatown was home to 
55,864 Asian residents and 33,658 Asian workers, many of whom are low-income, lack 
English language skills and are poorly educated.14  
 
As New York’s immigrant population has expanded and Manhattan rents have 
skyrocketed in recent years, a number of other Asian communities have sprung up in the 
outer boroughs.  The largest Asian community is now in Queens, with a population of 
433,553 recorded in the 2000 Census.   Brooklyn has the second largest Asian population 
in New York, with 206,272 Asian residents, the largest concentration of which is in 
Sunset Park.   
 
The development of vibrant Asian communities in Queens and Brooklyn not 
withstanding, Manhattan’s Chinatown remains a major cultural, social and economic 
center for the Chinese American population in New York City.  People who reside in 
Chinatown walk to work in the businesses located there, and others commute to 
Chinatown from the outer boroughs.  The major industries in Chinatown are tourism, 
retail and the garment industry, which together represent the majority of jobs in 
Chinatown.  Chinatown also offers specialized services such as Chinese doctors, 
herbalists, acupuncturists and lawyers.15   
 
The Garment Industry 
 
The garment industry has always been one of the most important to Chinatown’s 
economy and employs more workers than any other industry.  Prior to September 11th, 
there were an estimated 246 factories in Chinatown, employing approximately 14,000 
workers.16   
 
Traditionally, the Chinatown garment business played one part in a system of production 
that has been described as horizontal, with different entities being responsible for 
different components of the production process: 
 
· Manufacturers that cut fabric;  
 
· Contractors that receive cut fabric and assemble it;  
 
· Jobbers serving as middlemen between contractors and buyers—they finance 
production and take orders from retailers; and 
  
· Buyers, mostly women’s apparel companies, including 7th Avenue Garment 
District buyers, low-end retailers (e.g. Walmart, Limited, etc.) and middle-market 
retailers (e.g. Liz Claiborne).  High-end retailers have generally not relied upon 
Chinatown manufacturers for their production needs.  
 
In the last several years, there has been a significant shift in the apparel industry.  Buyers 
now look for garment factories that can provide “full package” or “vertical” production, 
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which means being able to offer a combination of services formerly provided by separate 
manufacturers, contractors and jobbers.  While Chinatown companies and other local 
manufacturers are generally not set up for full package production, companies in Hong 
Kong and other countries have this capacity.  Like many manufacturing industries in the 
United States, the garment industry began moving overseas.17   
 
The reason Chinatown manufacturers are not set up for full package production is 
primarily because it requires capital, something that most Chinatown garment businesses 
do not have access to or do not know how to secure.  In addition, several of the key 
informants with whom we spoke suggested that many garment manufacturers in 
Chinatown do not have the management skills needed to make the transition to full 
package firms.  
 
     The Niche for New York Garment Industry Manufacturers 
 
As the garment market has shifted, New York City manufacturers still occupy important 
niches in the garment industry: 
 
· Test orders and inventory replenishment for large retail companies.  Retailers 
such and Liz Claiborne and Nicole Miller need manufacturers who can turn 
around orders for sample items and inventory replenishment quickly.  These small 
orders need to be completed within two weeks of a request, and Chinatown 
manufacturers are set up well to do this.  
 
· Manufacturing and assembly for young designers.  Young designers, who often 
operate out of small boutiques, do not have the capital or the bulk production 
needs that would warrant overseas production.  New York-based production 
makes the most sense and some of these designers use Chinatown manufacturers.  
 
· Uniform production.  Production of uniforms is appealing because it is typically 
large scale and long-term.  Also, uniform wearers (military, police) often have an 
interest in U.S.-based production either because of ideology or union affiliation.  
There are several manufacturers in Chinatown that have uniform contracts with 
the City.   
 
· High-end manufacturing and assembly.  High-end manufacturing and assembly is 
still done in New York City, but typically in the garment district, not in 
Chinatown. 18 
 
While these niche markets mean that there are still opportunities for Chinatown garment 
businesses, it is unlikely that the industry as a whole will return to the production level of 
a decade or more ago. Some believe that, while September 11th was devastating to the 
industry, it meant that the stronger garment businesses survived and many of the less 
stable factories went out of business.  In recent months, garment businesses have started 
increasing production again and are looking for workers.   
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Real Estate 
 
Over the past several years, rents have been increasing dramatically in Manhattan, and 
Chinatown has been affected in two primary ways.  First, the high rents have pushed 
many low-income residents out of Chinatown to neighborhoods in outlying boroughs 
such as Sunset Park, Brooklyn.   
 
Second, rising rents have had a serious impact on garment industry businesses.    Many 
landlords have converted factory space to office space because they can ask for higher 
rents.19  According to Linda Dworak, Executive Director of the Garment Industry 
Development Corporation, landlords have been shifting to month-to-month leases 
because they want the flexibility to take on higher-paying tenants, creating great 
insecurity for garment businesses.  
 
Rents for garment manufacturers in Chinatown are around $15 per square foot, which is 
high for manufacturing.  In Brooklyn, they could be paying approximately $7 per square 
foot, but despite the lower rents, many garment manufacturers do not want to move.  
GIDC focus groups with garment business owners found that many did not want to move 
because they anticipated loosing 50 percent of their workforce if they did.  Focus group 
participants estimated that it would take six to eight months to train new workers.  
 
However, a few Chinatown-based companies are moving to Brooklyn.  For example, 
TechSew, one of the companies that shifted to full package, vertical production, is 
moving to Sunset Park.  TechSew has a number of military contracts and employs 300 
workers.  Whether this is the start of a trend remains to be seen. 
 
GIDC recently organized a tour of potential manufacturing space in Sunset Park for 
Chinatown garment companies.  Ms. Dworak said that there were some great spaces, but 
most were too big for the small Chinatown manufacturers.  To fill these spaces, the 
garment businesses would have to join together.  This may be one way to shift from 
horizontal to full package vertical production. 
 
While September 11th had a serious impact on the garment industry, it had already been 
in decline for many years.  Despite efforts to stem the loss of garment industry jobs, it is 
unlikely that employment in the industry will return to peak levels, even when the city’s 
economy begins to recover.  New immigrants and current garment workers will not be 
able to rely on the garment industry to the same extent, and will need to look to other 
industries for employment.  
 
STRUCTURE AND DELIVERY OF NEG SERVICES IN CHINATOWN 
 
The announcement that CMP, CPC and CCHC would receive NEG funding was made in 
December 2001 and the grantee organizations began enrolling participants in January 
2002.  Decisions had to be made quickly about what training to provide and how services 
should be structured.  The organizations were expected to meet contract goals within 
nine-months.  (The grant was ultimately extended and the programs served participants 
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through December 2002.)  The following is a description of how each of the agencies 
used the NEG to deliver services. 
 
Chinatown Manpower Project 
 
Founded in 1971, CMP is one of the oldest providers of workforce development services 
in Chinatown.  The organization has, from its inception, provided English as a Second 
Language (ESL) and skills training.  The first classes offered were ESL and keypunching 
classes funded by a grant from IBM.  Today, CMP provides ESL classes, a range of skills 
training programs, services to in-school and out-of-school youth, and services to small 
businesses in Chinatown.   
 
While CMP’s offices are located in Manhattan’s Chinatown, the organization draws 
participants from the entire metropolitan area, particularly Brooklyn and Queens.  CMP 
has plans to open offices in Brooklyn to respond to the needs of the large low-income 
Asian population that now resides in Sunset Park.  Prior to September 11th, CMP was 
serving approximately 1,000 people per year on a budget of about $3.3 million.   
 
After an initial investigation as to what training would best meet the needs of dislocated 
Chinatown workers, CMP decided to start two new training programs, for home health 
aides and for nail specialists.20  In addition, it placed participants with good English 
language skills into its computer/office skills training program.  After conducting an 
intake assessment, staff referred participants either to skills training classes, if they 
possessed adequate English skills, or to ESL if they did not.  Participants who reached an 
adequate level of English language skill through CMP’s ESL classes could graduate to 
skills training.  After completing training or ESL classes, participants met with job 
developers who were responsible for placement.  A limited number of participants were 
funneled into direct placement services without receiving ESL or skills training.  
 
Chinese American Planning Council 
 
In response to the growing Chinese immigrant population in Chinatown, the CPC was 
started in 1965 with $80 from the sale of a used car.  Offices were opened on Canal Street 
to provide English classes to the Chinatown community.  Since its founding, the 
organization has grown in size and scope.  It is now a $50 million multiservice agency 
with 50 programs and 27 sites serving 4,000 to 5,000 clients daily.  Half the budget is 
accounted for by CPC’s home health attendant business. 
 
The mission of the organization is to provide services to immigrants so they can become 
self-sufficient.   CPC seeks to provide training in multiple occupations: 
 
· Garment workers are retrained for fashion industry jobs. 
 
· Restaurant workers are retrained for customer service and hospitality jobs.  
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· Other workers are trained or retrained for clerical, home health attendant and 
multimedia/graphic design positions. 
 
CPC has a sequential strategy of work-oriented ESL training followed by vocational 
training.  Participants must show a certain level of English proficiency to participate in 
skills training.  If they do not meet this minimum level, CPC provides them with ESL 
training.  
 
Under the NEG, CPC offered a combination of skills training, ESL, job readiness and 
direct placement.  Participants in direct placement who did not go into training still 
received job readiness classes and job search assistance.  Some were also referred to 
evening ESL classes, which were not funded by the NEG.  
 
Most participants who received skills training were funneled into CPC’s home health 
attendant training program, which lasts for 9 to13 weeks and runs from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday.  Classes consisted of a combination of ESL and skills training 
that ultimately prepared students for the state licensing exam and certification.  The 
curriculum had to be refined to meet the needs of this population, which tended to have 
lower English language skills than do CPC’s typical clients.  Some participants were 
placed in CPC’s office skills training program, but few qualified because this program 
required a higher level of English language ability in addition to basic computer skills.   
 
Chinese Christian Herald Crusade 
 
CCHC is a 20-year-old international Christian organization that was started in New York 
City.  The New York City site has a membership of over 200 Chinese Christian churches 
and a budget totaling $800,000, 90 percent of which comes from private individual 
donations.  The NEG represented CCHC’s entrée into workforce development and, 
indeed, into public funding in general.  The organization focuses primarily on providing 
social services, including programs for youth, classes for seniors, legal counseling and 
couples counseling.  It also provides “practical English” classes, such as English for 
restaurant workers, English for naturalization and a general vocational English class.       
 
CCHC did an initial assessment of options for using the NEG money and decided to 
provide practical English classes to participants and refer some to outside home health 
aide training programs offered by Prestige and Best Care, two for-profit companies.  
Students were required to pay for the training up front and were then reimbursed by 
CCHC for the cost—$200 for two weeks of full- time classes.  CCHC did intakes on 
many individuals who did not have adequate English language skills to qualify for the 
training.  Some took basic English classes at CCHC, while others were referred to other 
agencies for more intensive ESL.  
 
Coordination Among the Three Grantees 
 
Historically, CMP and CPC have been the primary providers of publicly supported 
workforce development services in Chinatown.  As long-time competitors in a tightly 
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knit community, these organizations are very familiar with each other.  They provide 
similar services and serve similar populations but, before the NEG, had never worked 
together on a common project or program.  CPC had collaborated with CCHC in the past, 
but on programs that were more social-service oriented. 
 
There was little coordination among the three grantees with respect to the services 
provided under the NEG.  While CMP was the primary contractor, its principal 
relationship to its subcontractors was to collect data from them.  CMP took an 
administrative fee from the grants to its subcontractors for this work. Each program was 
responsible for its own intake process and for designing its own program in accordance 
with the requirements of the NEG.   
 
The only meeting that occurred among the Chinatown grantees was immediately after the 
grant was awarded.  The purpose was to discuss the requirements of the contract and to 
attempt to coordinate services.  After this initial meeting, contact among the three 
organizations was limited to telephone calls regarding data collection issues.  The lack of 
communication posed a particular challenge for CCHC, which was new to the workforce 
system and would have benefited from guidance on how to implement an effective 
program.   CMP and CPC were familiar with the WIA system and accustomed to 
providing workforce development services. 
  
Observations about the Development and Structure of NEG Programs 
 
While the three organizations developed their programs independently, they had similar 
experiences trying to design programs that would meet the needs of NEG participants.  
As a result of these experiences and contract requirements that focused on the provision 
of WIA-defined services, CMP, CPC and CCHC developed programs that were quite 
similar. 
 
     Identifying Target Industries to Meet the Needs of NEG Participants 
 
All three agencies experienced difficulty identifying industries for which to retrain the 
workers dislocated after September 11th.  They were faced with a weak economy and 
with participants who had characteristics that made them difficult to serve.  All three 
agencies selected home health care as a training target.  Additionally, CMP offered 
computer/office skills and nail specialist training.    
 
CCHC’s decision to refer participants to home health aide training was based on a 
number of factors.  First, it was faced with having to implement a new program within a 
short time period without experience in providing employment services or training.   
Second, CCHC needed to find a growth industry for which individuals with no or little 
English language proficiency could be hired.  Finally, CCHC felt it could capitalize upon 
a pre-existing relationship with Prestige, a home health aide training and placement 
agency serving primarily Chinese clients.   
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CMP and CPC explored the possibility of on-the-job training as a service option in which 
the organizations would subsidize up to 50 percent of the wages of participants for a 
period of 8 to 12 months.  Originally, CPC wanted to use this as one of its primary 
strategies. However, both organizations found that employers were not responsive to the 
program.  Large employers did not want to take the time to complete the documentation 
necessary for reimbursement.  One CMP staff member remarked, “If big employers 
needed to hire someone, they usually were willing to pay the full wage and did not want 
to deal with the paperwork.”  Contractors faced a different problem with small 
Chinatown employers.  When they discovered that it was a government program, they did 
not want to participate because they feared that workplace violations would be 
discovered.  
 
CPC also did research on the security and food service industries as possible avenues for 
placing NEG participants.  It found that many participants were not interested in going 
back into the restaurant industry.  Security jobs require physical work and English 
language skills, and thus did not match the profile of the NEG clients, 40- to 50- year old 
women with poor English language skills.  Home health attendant jobs seemed a good 
option because these positions offered wages of about $7 per hour and benefits, and did 
not require English language skills.      
 
     Recruitment 
 
Each organization was responsible for its own recruitment and intake process.  They 
recruited participants through a variety of methods, including advertisements in 
community newspapers, on Chinese cable stations and through existing referral networks.  
For example, CCHC relied upon its network of member churches to recruit participants.  
Most participants heard about the program through word of mouth.  None of the 
programs had difficulty in recruiting participants; classrooms were full and people were 
on wait lists to receive services.   
 
All three programs conducted an initial assessment of participants to determine their 
eligibility, interests, experience and goals.  Participants were tested for their English 
language ability to determine whether they should receive training or additional ESL.    
At all three organizations, a certain level of English language ability was necessary to 
participate in skills training. 
 
     Characteristics of Participants Served 
 
Historically, CMP, CPC and CCHC have primarily served Chinese immigrants, which 
was likely one of the reasons they were selected to provide NEG services in Chinatown.  
This did not change under the NEG; nearly 100 percent of participants were Asian and 
most were Chinese.  The majority of NEG participants came from Manhattan or 
Brooklyn.   
 
However, participants served under the NEG were different than the grantees’ typical 
clientele in several respects.  The majority of participants served under the NEG were 
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women between the ages of 40 and 50 who had been laid off from the garment industry.  
The organizations also served some individuals who had lost restaurant or retail jobs. 
Most had worked in these industries for many years and had very low English language 
skills.   While the organizations were accustomed to serving mostly women, they were 
not used to serving so many women over 40 and with a lack of diverse work experience.   
CMP and CPC both indicated that the people they saw after September 11th were much 
more difficult to serve than their typical clients. CPC, in particular, said that historically 
their participants were usually motivated to seek assistance because they wanted to obtain 
training for advancement.  NEG participants were forced to seek assistance in the midst 
of a crisis in which they had lost their jobs and had few or no other options.   
 
P/PV was able to obtain detailed demographic information on participants who came to 
CMP seeking assistance after September 11th.   While not all of these participants ended 
up enrolling in the NEG program, the data shown in Table 1 provide a sense of the 
challenge CMP faced in designing a program that would be an appropriate match for the 
backgrounds and experiences of these clients.  CMP’s data indicate the following about 
individuals seeking services in Chinatown after September 11th: 
 
· They were predominantly female—78 percent of applicants were female; 
· They were middle-aged—79 percent were 41 years or older; 
· They were very low income—68 percent had a family income of $9,000 or less in 
the six months prior to applying to the program; 
· They were low wage workers—60 percent made between $5.15 and $7 per hour 
in their previous job; 
· They had significant work experience—73 percent had worked four years or 
more, and nearly a third had worked for over ten years; and 
· They came from the garment industry—66 percent had been laid off from the 
garment industry. 
 
     Core and Intensive Services 
 
The NEG follows the WIA structure of offering core, intensive and training services 
sequentially.  Core services at each organization consisted of an initial assessment, case 
management and basic job search assistance.  Intensive services varied more widely 
across the three organizations, although all offered English classes and job placement.  
ESL classes were offered at CMP and CPC, while CCHC offered practical English and a 
basic English course.  In addition to skills training and ESL, CMP offered computer 
training and CPC provided job readiness classes.   
 
PERFORMANCE OF NEG CONTRACTORS 
 
As shown in Table 2, CMP, CPC and CCHC enrolled a total of 519 people under the 
NEG.  Every participant who enrolled in the program received core services and the 
majority (93%) received intensive services.  A smaller number of enrollees (37%) 
participated in skills training.   
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Table 1 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF 481 NEG 
APPLICANTS AT CMP 
 
Sex: 
Female           
Male              
 
Age: 
Under 21              
21 to 30 
31 to 40 
41 to 54 
55+ 
 
Length in US: 
Less than 1 year 
1 to 5 years 
5 years + 
Born in US 
 
Residence: 
Manhattan 
Queens 
Brooklyn 
Bronx 
Staten Island 
 
Number of Family 
Members: 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six or more 
 
Family Income  
(past six months) 
$0 to $5,000 
$5,001 to 7,000 
$7,001 to $$9,000 
$9,001 to $14,000 
$14,001 to $18,000 
$18,001 to $22,000 
$22,000 + 
Receiving UI 
 
77.92% 
22.08% 
 
 
  0.00% 
  3.14% 
18.03% 
59.75% 
19.08% 
 
 
    .42% 
  6.57% 
92.80% 
    .21% 
 
 
33.61% 
24.37% 
38.45% 
  2.31% 
  1.26% 
 
 
 
11.79% 
25.26% 
25.47% 
25.47% 
10.11% 
  1.89% 
 
 
 
29.80% 
21.63% 
16.11% 
16.56% 
  6.84% 
  1.99% 
  5.96% 
  1.10% 
 
Salary: 
$5.15 to $7/hour 
$7.01 to $10/hour 
$10.01 to $15/hour 
$15+/hour 
 
Length of Time Worked: 
Less than1 year 
1 to 3 years 
4 to 10 years 
10 years + 
 
Industry Laid Off From: 
Garment 
Restaurant 
Retail 
Finance/Insurance 
Travel/Tourism 
Transportation/Delivery 
Others 
 
Education: 
J.H.S. Graduate (any) 
H.S. Graduate (any) 
College (non-U.S.) 
College (U.S.) 
 
Barriers to Employment: 
English 
Cultural 
Skills 
Age 
Transportation 
Child Care 
Health 
Others 
 
60.23% 
17.47% 
  7.82% 
14.48% 
 
 
  5.12% 
22.05% 
40.76% 
32.07% 
 
 
65.57% 
  9.60% 
  2.58% 
  1.41% 
  1.17% 
  1.41% 
18.27% 
 
 
44.44% 
45.15% 
  7.09% 
  3.31% 
 
 
67.36% 
  3.33% 
58.21% 
11.64% 
  1.25% 
    .21% 
  0.00% 
  4.99% 
Source: Data self reported by participants at intake for the development of their Individual Assistance Plan (IEP). 
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Table 2 
 
ENROLLMENT IN CORE, INTENSIVE AND TRAINING SERVICES 
 
 Enrolled Core Intensive Training 
 
CMP 
 
185 
 
185 
 
148 
 
98 
CPC 181 181 181 59 
CCHC 153 153 153 33 
 
Total 
 
519 
 
519 
 
482 
 
        190 
 
 
Staff from all three organizations said they would have liked to place more participants in 
skills training, but these programs required higher English language skills than those 
possessed by many of the NEG participants.  Therefore, each contractor put an emphasis 
on providing English classes to participants, although only CMP and CCHC used the 
NEG to support English language classes.   
 
Job Placement 
 
Across the three programs, the average placement rate for those who enrolled was 35 
percent, as shown in Table 3.  CMP had the highest placement rate (46%), followed by 
CPC with 39 percent and CCHC with 17 percent.  Overall, placement rates were higher 
for participants who went through skills training than for those who did not (58 percent 
compared to 35 percent).  (It should be noted that placement rates include participants 
who found jobs on their own, without job placement assistance from the program.)  
 
Table 3 
 
PLACEMENT RATES 
 
 
Total 
Number 
Enrolled 
Total 
Number 
Employed 
Percentage 
Employed 
out of Total 
Enrolled 
Total 
Number 
in 
Training 
Number 
Employed 
Who Had 
Received 
Training 
Percentage 
Employed 
out of Total 
Who Had 
Received 
Training 
 
CMP 
 
185 
 
86 
 
46% 
 
98 
 
46 
 
47% 
CPC 181 71 39% 59 38 64% 
CCHC 153 26 17% 33   26a 79% 
 
Total 
 
519 
          
     183 
 
35% 
 
     190 
 
     110 
 
58% 
 
a CCHC tracked placements only for those who went through the home health aide training. 
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More participants were placed in home health care jobs than in any other occupation.  
Agencies reported that these jobs worked well for limited English speakers; the hours 
were steady and some jobs came with benefits, though wages were low.  However, for 
the middle-aged women who had worked in the garment industry for many years, career 
change was difficult.  Many participants had rarely ventured outside their neighborhood 
or Chinatown, and home health care jobs required that they take public transportation to 
clients throughout the city, a challenge for many.    
 
Grantees also reported difficulty convincing participants of the benefits of formal 
employment when they were used to getting paid, at least partially, in cash, off the books.  
CPC staff said that NEG participants needed more career counseling and emotional 
support than did their typical clients. 
 
CMP faced difficulty with the newly implemented training for nail specialists.  While this 
occupation may have been a good match for participants in terms of their skills, the 
characteristics of nail businesses complicated job placement.  When CMP tried to place 
trained participants, they learned that most nail salons pay their employees cash, off the 
books, which meant that CMP could not get verification for these placements.  A general 
lesson learned may be that employers should be involved in the NEG planning process 
when identifying new or expanding existing training programs. While employers may not 
guarantee that they will hire, they can verify the need for workers and provide 
information on the hiring patterns in particular industries. 
 
Other Employment Outcomes 
 
The average wages for nail specialist and home health care positions are generally low, 
ranging around $6 and $7 per hour, near what participants were earning prior to 
dislocation.  At CMP, the highest entry wages were for participants who had enrolled in 
computer training or in the direct placement track, as shown in Table 4.   
 
CPC provided an estimate of the average wage for all participants through the NEG 
program, including those who went into training and those who did not.  It reported an 
average weekly wage of $287.25, which equals approximately $8.21 per hour for a 35-
hour work week.   
 
CCHC collected less information on outcomes than did the other contractors who, as 
experienced participants in the workforce development system, were used to collecting 
data on retention and wages.  CCHC did not collect data on wage at placement or data on 
retention.  Staff indicated that they received little direction about the kinds of information 
they needed to collect when the contract began.  Only recently were staff told that they 
would have to collect data on job retention.  CCHC is planning to conduct follow-up calls 
with participants in April to see if participants are still employed.   
 
Through the Eye of A Needle: The Challenge of Providing Employment Services in New York’s Chinatown Post September 11 th  
Public/Private Ventures 
May 2, 2003 
 
 16 
Table 4 
 
AVERAGE WAGE AT PLACEMENT FOR CMP PARTICIPANTS 
 
  
Number Placed 
 
Hourly wage 
 
Skills Training 
  
 
Home Health Aide 22 $6.35 
Nail Specialist   9 $7.71 
Computer 
 
Other 
ESL 
15 
 
 
21 
             $15.18 
 
 
$9.37 
Direct Placement 18              $10.49 
OJT 
 
Total Placements 
  1 
 
86 
 
             $10.00 
 
$9.68 
 
 
Despite CMP’s experience, it had difficulty collecting data on retention outcomes.  Of the 
86 participants who found employment, CMP was only able to reach 34 people at 90 
days, of all of who were employed.  After 180 days, three-quarters of those who were 
contacted were working.  CPC also faced difficulty with retention.  At 90 days, 45 
percent of those who had found employment were still working.  
 
Impact of September 11th Fund Programs 
 
In September 2002, the September 11th Fund launched a $50 million program to assist 
workers displaced as a result of the attacks; the program was fully operational by January 
2003.  This program has affected the NEG grantees and garment industry employers.   
 
Funding for the program was allocated to six nonprofit organizations in Manhattan and 
was designed to retrain and place individuals who had been laid off as a result of the 
terrorist attacks.  To be eligible, participant s must have lost their jobs between September 
11, 2001 and January 11, 2002, be unemployed or underemployed, and have resided or 
worked below Canal Street on September 11th.   
 
The first step to obtaining services is to be certified as eligible by Safe Horizons, at which 
time participants are given a card that allows them access to September 11th Fund 
services.  As of March 20, Safe Horizons had seen over 12,000 people and certified 8,665 
as eligible, over half of whom speak Chinese as their primary language.  In addition to 
skills training and placement, participants can receive one year of health coverage, 
assistance with other health costs and a one-time $500 grant to help with expenses.  Most 
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significantly, participants enrolled in ESL classes can get a $300 per week stipend while 
they participate in 13 weeks of 25-hours-per-week ESL training.   
 
The September 11th Fund Program has had an impact on NEG placement and retention 
rates because some participants reportedly would rather participate in subsidized part-
time ESL training than in paid work.  In fact, garment factories that have started to scale 
up production complain that they are unable to find workers.21  The pay for garment work 
is approximately the same as the Fund’s stipend, $300 per week, but involves working 
many more hours in difficult working conditions.  Many are taking the opportunity to 
enroll in ESL classes rather than return to work, at least for the time being.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT  
 
The primary purpose of the NEG was to increase the capacity of the workforce system to meet the 
employment needs that arose in Chinatown after September 11th.  The grant was generally effective 
in increasing the capacity of each of the grantees to provide services to dislocated job seekers.  The 
Chinatown grantees received NEG funding in January 2002.  To assess whether there was an 
increase in capacity, we examined the change in the number served in adult employment programs 
from the 2001 to the 2002 calendar year.  Both participants who received training and those who 
received other employment services were included in this analysis.  The results are shown in Table 
5. 
 
Table 5 
 
NUMBER SERVED IN EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FROM CALENDAR 
YEAR 2001 TO 2002 
 
 Calendar 
Year 2001 
Calendar 
Year 2002 
Percent 
Change 
 
CMP Enrolled 
 
461 
 
928 
 
 +101% 
CPC Enrolled 508 482       -5% 
CCHC Enrolled     0 153          n.a. 
 
Total Enrolled 
 
969 
 
     1562 
 
   +61% 
 
      
Note:     Each of the three organizations operates on a July through June fiscal year, but has 
some grants that operate on a different calendar.  Because the NEG began in January 
2002, we examined program services on a calendar year basis.  Several adjustments to 
agency data were required to ensure consistent presentation. 
 
 
Overall, the three organizations enrolled approximately 593 more people in 2002 than they did in 
2001, representing a 61 percent increase.  CCHC experienced the greatest increase in capacity to 
provide adult employment services because it had never before provided them.  CMP nearly doubled 
the number of participants it enrolled in its adult employment programs from 2001 to 2002.  This 
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large increase can be attributed, in part, to the additional funding it received in September 2002 from 
the September 11th Fund.  CMP enrolled 297 people from September to December 2002 using 
September 11th Fund resources.  CPC actually experienced a slight decline in the number enrolled in 
its employment programs from 2001 to 2002.  This may have been because a contract with the New 
York City Department of Human Resources (HRA) to serve special populations ended in FY2003.   
 
Budgetary Impact  
 
As shown in Table 6, grantees were able to increase their capacity because the NEG 
represented a significant increase in funding for their adult employment programs.  After 
distribution of funds to subcontractors, CMP’s grant amount of $536,444 represented 22 
percent of its budget for adult employment and ESL programs in FY2002.  From FY2001 
to FY2002, CMP’s budget for adult employment and ESL programs increased by 
$1,402,449 or 129 percent.  The NEG represented 38 percent of this increase and the rest 
came from new grants that CMP received in FY2002, several of which were aimed at 
responding to the September 11th attacks.  CMP was able to maintain its funding level in 
FY 2003 because of a $1 million grant from the September 11th Fund. 
 
CPC’s budget for adult employment and ESL programs also increased as a result of the 
$302,200 it received through the NEG.   From FY2001 to FY2002, funding went up by 
$548,752.  The NEG represented 55 percent of this change.   
 
Table 6 
 
BUDGET FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ESL PROGRAMS 
 
 Fiscal Year 
2001 
 (July 2000 – 
June 2001) 
Fiscal Year 
2002 
(July 2001 – 
June 2002) 
Fiscal Year 
2003 
(July 2002 – 
June 2003) 
 
CMP 
 
$1,085,201 
 
$2,487,650 
 
$2,414,548 
CPC $1,167,530 $1,716,282 $1,488,492 
CCHC        $5,000 
 
   $160,085 
 
     $25,000 
 
Note: All figures are drawn from agency budgets and have been adjusted to ensure 
consistent presentation.    
 
 
The $160,085 in NEG funding was significant for CCHC because it allowed them to hire 
an instructor to teach the practical English classes.  Prior to the NEG, CCHC relied upon 
volunteers to teach English classes and needed only a small budget of $5,000 to cover the 
transportation of volunteers and some administrative costs. 
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New Services Offered 
 
One way to measure the effect of the NEG is to assess the extent to which it led to the 
creation of new programs to meet the needs of the target population.  Before the NEG, 
CCHC was entirely supported by private funding and had never tapped into public funds.  
Nor had it ever been involved in the workforce development system.  While CCHC did 
not directly provide skills training under the NEG, it gained exposure to the public 
system.  This experience could prove useful should the organization decide to seek 
government funding in the future.    
 
CMP and CPC both made adjustments to their services to meet the needs of NEG 
participants, who tended to be harder to serve than typical CMP and CPC clients.  CMP 
started new home health aide and nail specialist trainings in response to the grant.  While 
the nail specialist training was unsuccessful, CMP was able to place many participants in 
home health aide positions.  CPC tailored its pre-existing home health attendant training 
program so that it was more appropriate for NEG participants.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The cataclysmic events of September 11th made it imperative for the U.S. 
Department of Labor to provide emergency funds for employment assistance, 
including in Chinatown.  Considering the severe consequences for New York 
City’s economy in general and Chinatown in particular, it is unthinkable that 
assistance would not have been provided.  USDOL and NYSDOL deserve credit 
for responding quickly, ensuring that resources were hitting the street soon after 
September 11th.   
 
The structure and process used by the New York State Department of Labor 
allowed the contractors to begin quickly meeting the needs of workers.  By 
choosing to use line item budgets instead of performance based contracts, and by 
relying on previously approved contractors, selected organizations, including 
CMP, were able to start providing employment services within a few weeks. 
 
The National Emergency Grant funds allocated to CMP resulted in a sizable 
expansion in services to dislocated workers.  More than 500 people enrolled in the 
NEG program, well beyond the target in the original contract.  As a result, in 
aggregate, the three organizations were able to provide considerably more 
employment assistance than they would have otherwise. 
 
The total number of people served by CMP, CPC and CCHC was a small portion 
of those in need of employment assistance.  By most estimates, several thousand 
workers were affected by the economic consequences of September 11th – only a 
small percentage of whom received assistance through the NEG.  To provide 
context, close to 9,000 people have already been certified as eligible for 
September 11th Fund assistance and over 3,000 have enrolled in the Fund’s 
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Employment Assistance Program (EAP).   Over half of those enrolled in EAP 
speak Chinese as their primary language. 
 
Employment outcomes were mixed.  In aggregate, including the NYUL, 231 of 
the 577 people who enrolled found employment, which is equivalent to a 40 
percent placement rate.  (For the three Chinatown organizations, 35 percent of the 
519 participants who enrolled found employment.)  This is well below the 
contract goal of 75 percent.  Nevertheless, the total number of people employed 
after receiving NEG-funded services exceeded the overall contract goal of 208 
because the four organizations enrolled far more people than had been projected.22 
 
Services were not coordinated.  As noted earlier, the nature of this grant and 
subcontracts did not emphasize coordinated services and arrangements were made 
with the involvement of U.S. DOL and NYSDOL to expedite the grant process.   
Also, each of the three organizations had not collaborated much in the past and, in 
the case of CMP and CPC, have been competitors for many years, each operated 
independent ly under the NEG.  Each conducted its own outreach and recruitment 
and there may have been some overlap in services, e.g., CMP and CPC both 
training for home health care occupations. Given the small size of the grant and 
the large number of people to be served, duplication may not have been a 
problem.  However, more coordinated services could have also had a positive 
impact on job placement outcomes because organizations would not have all been 
trying to place participants in the same occupation. 
 
It is important to consider these findings in context.  First, the workers who enrolled in 
the NEG-funded program were particularly difficult to serve.  Most were older women 
who had spent many years working in low-wage jobs in New York City’s garment 
industry.  Many had limited ability to speak English, which, according to staff at all three 
organizations, made them poor candidates for training.  In fact, more NEG participants 
took ESL classes than enrolled in training. Nearly all participants were of Chinese 
descent, worked in Manhattan and lived in Chinese communities either in Brooklyn or 
Queens.  Many had rarely ventured outside their enclaves and were hesitant to seek 
employment in other areas and industries.  Staff reported that many participants were also 
suffering emotional trauma related to the events of September 11th.  
 
At the same time, the three contractors were attempting to help people find jobs during a 
period of near economic paralysis.  Several factors—including the numbing shock of 
September 11th itself, the rapid decline in tourism, the immediate and months- long 
consequences of the clean up and security precautions in downtown Manhattan, Wall 
Street’s scandals and market decline, as well as the national recession—combined to 
make the months following September 11th a particularly difficult time for job seekers.  
Of course, job losses also meant that graduates of the three Chinatown programs faced 
stiff competition from other job seekers, including participants from other NEG 
contractors.  So, in essence, CMP, CPC and CCHC found themselves trying to thread the 
eye of a very small needle, with few easy answers. 
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Recommendations 
 
USDOL representatives have said they are particularly interested in recommendations 
about how to structure National Emergency Grants in similar circumstances.  While we 
are willing to make suggestions, it should be recognized that they are based on rapid 
assessment of one contract executed after a very unusual event, and should be interpreted 
in that light. 
 
· State and local contracting requirements can have considerable impact on 
the timing and allocation of NEG funds.  In this case, New York State was able 
to address procurement requirements quickly, allowing the rapid use of resources.  
This may not always be possible, which could cause serious delays in the use of 
funds (a serious issue for an emergency grant program). USDOL may want to 
consider developing mechanisms that will ensure that funds can be deployed 
quickly, particularly in situations where non-governmental contractors will 
deliver services. 
 
· Unusual labor market conditions demand unusual approaches.  By definition, 
National Emergency Grants will be used in unusual circumstances and the 
Department may want to consider how to increase the flexibility of its resources. 
While standard WIA services may be appropriate for many job seekers, a large 
number of participants served under the CMP contract needed long-term, 
intensive English classes before they would be able to train for new occupations.  
While ESL classes were allowed under the NEG, contract goals and funding 
precluded the long-term investment many participants needed.   The need for ESL 
classes in the case of the Chinatown NEG may also provide lessons for ETA 
workforce development strategies more generally in how to serve Asian 
Americans, Pacific Islanders, Hispanics and other nationalities with limited 
English proficiency. 
 
In situations that require the NEG, the Department may also want to encourage 
the use of resources to stimulate the demand side of the labor market in sectors 
that offer opportunity to those affected.  It might also consider investing its own 
political capital in bringing employers to the table. 
 
· USDOL may want to consider developing training in the effective use of 
National Emergency Grant funds.  Naturally, state and local government staff 
have limited experience using NEG resources.  USDOL may want to convene a 
group of state and local officials who have received NEG funds to discuss what 
worked well and what did not and, if appropriate, offer a rapid response team that 
can assist localities in using NEG resources as effectively as possible. 
 
· To the extent possible, ETA should promote or foster collaboration among 
various partners in response to emergency needs.  Grantees may take good 
advantage of partnerships established through the one-stop operating system not 
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only to provide services but also to leverage funds from other sources. 
 
· Consideration should be given to requiring collection of some common data 
elements on services, participants and outcomes.  Consistency with the 
Workforce Investment Act Standardized Record Data elements and, if applicable, 
the common core measures might be useful requirements under Emergency 
grants.  This is important both for program operation and for national purposes in 
reporting on NEG efforts. 
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Appendix A 
INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS 
 
Chiang, Hsiuhua, Program Director, Chinese American Planning Council, Inc., March 5, 
2003. 
 
Choy, Crispin, Project Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., February 24, 2003. 
 
Cooper, Patricia, Consultant, September 11th Fund, March 25, 2003. 
 
Dworak, Linda, Executive Director, Garment Industry Development Corporation, 
February 28, 2003. 
 
Eng, Helen, Project Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., February 24, 2003. 
 
Huang, Louise Yingsi, Program Director, National Emergency Grant Program, 
Chinatown Manpower Project, December 19, 2002.  
 
Huie, Susan, Project Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., February 24, 2003. 
 
Immerman, Susan, Deputy Director, September 11th Fund, March 25, 2003 
 
Kellerman, Carol, Executive Director and CEO, September 11th Fund, March 25, 2003. 
 
Lai, Teddy, General Manager, Greater Blouse, Skirt and Undergarment Association, 
February 28, 2003. 
 
Lam, Kenneth, Director, Community Services, Chinese Christian Herald Crusades, Inc., 
February 26, 2003.  
 
Loek, Chi, Assistant Executive Director, Employment and Training Division, Chinese 
American Planning Council, Inc., March 6, 2003. 
 
Melendez, James, Executive Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., December 19, 
2002 and February 24, 2003. 
 
Moree, Maggie, Director, Workforce Development and Training Division, New York 
State Department of Labor, February 5, 2003. 
 
Wang, Nora, President, Professional Group, Inc, former Executive Director of the 
Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., March 6, 2003. 
 
Wong, Vickie, Program Director, Chinese American Planning Council, Inc., March 6, 
2003. 
 
Yang, Dong, Project Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, February 24, 2003. 
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Yang, Yvonne, Project Director, Chinatown Manpower Project, Inc., February 24, 2003. 
 
Yee, Yue, Deputy Director, Workforce Development & Training Division, New 
York State Department of Labor, February 5, 2003. 
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